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INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations are an important sector of society, producing over 12 percent of Gross Domestic Product annually (Meckstroth and Arnsberger 1998) . In exchange for supplying public (collective) goods, nonprofits generally operate free of income, sales, and property taxes. Tax-exempt sources of nonprofit revenues include donations and grants, passive income on investments, and the sales of mission-related products or services. Revenues from sales activities that are unrelated to an organization's primary exempt mission are subject to an unrelated business income tax under IRC §511. Because taxable activities are by definition unrelated to the charitable purpose, nonprofits may have a natural aversion to them. If a nonprofit is inherently averse to ancillary ventures, it will earn taxable revenues only when it can earn a premium above the competitive rate of return that it could otherwise earn on passive investments (Cordes and Weisbrod 1998) . One way a nonprofit can increase the returns to unrelated activities is to exploit production complementarities (i.e., the use of existing facilities, production inputs, or knowledge base) between its primary mission-related activities and taxable commercial ventures. In theory, the ability to exploit production complementarities can produce premiums, and thus will encourage nonprofits to seek out and undertake taxable commercial ventures, for two reasons. First, the presence of complementarities increases the pre-tax return from taxable activities owing to lower production costs. Second, the presence of complementarities can make is easier to allocate joint costs from tax-exempt to taxable activities, thus increasing the after-tax returns to taxable activities. Prior research finds that nonprofits can and do allocate joint costs from their taxexempt to their taxable activities so as to reduce their unrelated business income tax liabilities (Sansing 1998 , Cordes and Weisbrod 1998 , Yetman 2001 . The effect of joint cost allocations on the incentive to earn taxable revenues may be stronger when the taxable revenues are earned from complementary sources because the ability to aggregate and allocate costs is enhanced by production complementarities (Sansing 1998) . Joint costs, such as those incurred by common production facilities, are economically un-separable and difficult to partition among multiple outputs. In general, the more complementary are the taxable and tax-exempt production processes, the more joint are the associated production costs. Because there is considerable managerial discretion in aggregating and allocating these joint costs, the presence of production complementarities provides managers with an enhanced ability to generously allocate costs to taxable activities, providing an increased incentive to earn taxable revenues.
The primary purpose of this paper is to use a database of confidential nonprofit tax returns (i.e., the IRS form 990-T) that were voluntarily supplied by the nonprofits to provide empirical evidence on the hypothesized effects of production complementarities on taxable revenues. Access to actual tax returns is important because, although nonprofits disclose limited information about their taxable activities on their publicly available IRS form 990, form 990-T data is needed to construct measures of production complementarities and joint cost allocations.
Testing these predictions is valuable for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that nonprofits are encouraged to produce taxable products where complementarities exist, overall economic efficiency can be enhanced. This is the case if either the complementarities permit a nonprofit to produce products at a lower cost or if the taxable activity utilizes otherwise unused facilities.
Second, the incentive to exploit complementarities can cause nonprofits to congregate their taxable activities into a relatively few economically related (but unrelated by tax law) categories.
Industry observers note that one potential cost of increasing nonprofit commercialization is that unrelated ventures can distract nonprofits from their primary charitable missions in the pursuit of ancillary profits (Weisbrod 1998) . The concentration of taxable activities into a few economically related categories may, to some extent, mitigate concerns over mission distraction.
An additional contribution of the paper is that it expands on the results found in prior research. Cordes and Weisbrod (1998) and Hines (1998) use data from the publicly available IRS form 990 which indicates whether the nonprofit earns taxable revenues or not and find that the likelihood that a nonprofit will earn taxable revenues is increasing in tax rates and assets and decreasing in the square of assets and the ratio of government grants to total donations. These findings are important because they suggest that aversion premiums are a factor in a nonprofits decision to engage in taxable ventures. Lacking access to nonprofits' tax returns, these prior studies were not able to examine the extent to which these same factors are associated with the amount of taxable revenues nonprofits earn. Access to actual tax returns permits me to extend these studies by using a continuous, rather than dichotomous, dependent variable (i.e., taxable revenues). It is important to note that the taxable activity decision is likely to be a two-step procedure where a nonprofit first decides whether or not it will engage in taxable ventures, and then decides how much taxable revenues to earn. Given that my sample consists only of those nonprofits that earn taxable revenues, my results are conditional on a nonprofit having already chosen to engage in taxable activities.
2
As the final part of my analysis, I examine the relationship between my measure of production complementarities based on the IRS form 990-T data, and organization-specific characteristics including organization size, type, and age. The purpose of this supplementary analysis is to produce a measure (or measures) of production complementarities that can be constructed with data from the publicly available IRS form 990. This analysis not only sheds light on prior research which used size and nonprofit type as proxies for a nonprofit's ability to exploit complementarities (Cordes and Weisbrod 1998) , but also provides useful information to future researchers who are limited to publicly available nonprofit data.
Results for educational and medical nonprofits show that taxable revenues are increasing in complementarities as well as the interaction of joint-cost allocations and complementarities.
These findings support the hypotheses that the ability to exploit production complementarities provides incentives to earn additional taxable revenues. I do not find that complementarities encourage charitable nonprofits to earn additional taxable revenues. In terms of magnitude, the ability to exploit production complementarities is associated with average additional taxable revenues of $172 thousand and $79 thousand for educational and medical nonprofits, respectively. In percentage terms, the incentives provided by complementarities increases taxable revenues by 45 percent for educational nonprofits and 30 percent for medical nonprofits.
Results with respect to the variables found by prior research to be associated with the decision to earn taxable revenues are mixed. Taxable revenues are increasing in assets and decreasing in assets squared (consistent with prior research), but are not associated with tax rates or the ratio of government grants to total donations (inconsistent with prior research). These findings suggest that, although there are some similarities between the factors that encourage nonprofits to engage in taxable activities and to earn additional taxable revenues, there are also some differences.
Additional analysis finds that, on average, 62 percent of educational and 56 percent of medical nonprofits are able to exploit production complementarities, while only 18 percent of charitable nonprofits have a similar ability. Older educational nonprofits, and older and larger medical nonprofits, are more able to exploit production complementarities. Neither age nor size is associated with a charitable nonprofit's ability to exploit production complementarities.
Theses findings suggest that an indicator variable equal to one if the nonprofit is a hospital or a university and zero otherwise as well as a continuous measure of nonprofit age would be reasonable proxies of a nonprofit's ability to exploit production complementarities. The advantage of these measures is that they can be constructed using publicly available nonprofit data. The next section discusses the data used in the analysis. Subsequent sections present and discuss the empirical analysis and concluding remarks follow.
DATA
The database used for the empirical analysis is a sub-sample of the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database which itself is a sub-sample of all nonprofits. The NCCS database includes all nonprofits with total assets of $10 million or more, plus a stratified random sample of smaller organizations, for a total annual sample of approximately 12,000 nonprofits.
Although the NCCS sub-sample includes data for only about 8 percent the 150,000 form 990s filed annually, it accounts for over 85 of total assets and revenues of all nonprofits. Included in the 1995 NCCS sub-sample are 2,316 nonprofits that reported earning taxable revenues. Due to size-weighted sampling these 2,316 nonprofits, which include only 25 percent of all nonprofits that reported taxable activity, collectively account for over 85 percent of total taxable revenues earned.
In response to a written request sent to all 2,316 nonprofits that reported earning taxable revenues in 1995, 703 nonprofits voluntarily supplied matching sets of their forms 990 and 990-T. Although three consecutive years of data were requested, an average of 2.6 returns per nonprofit were supplied making a pooled sample of 1,824 observations. The sample contains a relatively small 8 percent of all nonprofits that earned taxable revenues by number but captures an average of 33 percent of the total taxable revenues earned for each of 1995, 1996, and 1997.
Untabulated sample representativeness tests suggests that the sample is not jointly different from the population across total assets, total revenues, taxable revenues, total expenses and total donations.
EMPIRCAL ANALYSIS

Primary Estimation Model
My empirical model takes the form:
Because it is likely that the effects vary by industry type, I estimate equation (1) (Cordes and Weisbrod 1998, Hines 1998 ). This research finds that the probability of earning taxable revenues is increasing in Corptax and Assets and decreasing in Grants and Assets 2 .
I estimate equation (1) using two different specifications. The first specification uses unscaled variables with size controls. The second specification scales all variables by total assets.
Results are not qualitatively altered by using alternative scalars including total revenues and total program revenues or by using logged values. 7 Because my data is a pooled cross-section, I
include (but do not report) yearly fixed effects. In all cases, t-statistics are asymptotically corrected. All of the observations have non-zero values for taxable revenues and joint cost allocations. This finding suggests that including an indicator variable for nonprofit type would be a reasonable proxy of the extent to which a nonprofit can exploit production complementarities.
Univariate results
Average joint cost allocations are largest for medical nonprofits ($186 thousand) followed by educational ($156 thousand) and charitable (-$3 thousand) nonprofits. These findings are consistent with those in Yetman (2001) . Table 2 provides more detail on how these joint cost allocations vary by cost category.
Many of the mean allocations are negative for charitable nonprofits. There are two possible explanations for these negative reallocations, which appear to not make economic sense. First, they may be an artifact of the estimation process. The models used to calculate the allocations contain several inherent negative biases which would tend to understate the amount of allocations, even to the point of providing negative estimates. Second, charitable nonprofits may differ from educational or medical nonprofits in their fundamental philosophy with respect to taxable activity reporting, and may choose to report fewer expenses. For all types of nonprofits, the majority of cost allocations are in the expense category "other". Prior tax compliance research offers one plausible explanation as to why the majority of joint costs allocated from taxexempt activities are reported as "other" when reported on the nonprofit's the tax return (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998) . By reporting expenses in the "other" category, the taxpayer has provided as little information to the tax authorities as possible and retains flexibility to find support for its joint cost allocations should its tax return be eventually audited. The second largest category for joint cost allocations for educational and medical nonprofits is employee compensation expense. This finding is consistent with these types of nonprofits being more able to exploit complementarities because compensation expense is a frequent source of common production costs. For example, hospital medical laboratory employees produce both taxable and tax-exempt products. This finding is interesting because is suggests that complementarities affect the types of costs allocated.
A correlation analysis is presented in table 3. For educational and medical nonprofits, taxable revenues are positively correlated with both complementary and the interaction of complementary and joint-cost allocations. Similar relationships are not found for charitable nonprofits. Complement is correlated with age, but not total assets, for educational nonprofits.
Complement is correlated with both total assets and age for educational nonprofits. Neither age nor total assets are correlated with a charitable nonprofit's ability to exploit production complementarities. These correlation results suggest that a nonprofit's age (but not size) would be a reasonable proxy for a nonprofit's ability to exploit complementarities. These results have at least two implications. First, because nonprofits are encouraged to produce taxable products where complementarities exist, overall economic efficiency is enhanced if complementarities allow nonprofits to produce products at a lower cost or more fully use under-utilized facilities. Second, the incentive to focus their taxable activities into areas where complementarities exist likely causes nonprofits to limit the scope of their taxable activities into economically related ventures, partially mitigating concerns that taxable activities distract nonprofits from their exempt missions.
Regression results
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effects of production complementarities on the amount of taxable revenues earned by nonprofit organizations. Although nonprofits are generally exempt from taxation, they are subject to an unrelated business income tax on the portion of their sales revenues derived from ancillary commercial ventures. Unrelated commercial ventures comprise nonprofits' fastest growing revenue source. Because these activities are frequently not aligned with the nonprofits' primary exempt mission, managers may have a natural aversion to engaging in them. In order to overcome this natural aversion, taxable activities have to provide additional financial returns relative to alternative investments. One potential source of enhanced financial returns is production complementarities. Exploiting production complementarities increases the pre-tax return from taxable commercial ventures because of lower production costs, and increases the after-tax return by enhancing joint cost allocations from tax-exempt to taxable activities.
Using a database of confidential nonprofit tax returns, results of the analysis find that production complementarities affect the amount of taxable revenues nonprofits earn. In terms of magnitude, the ability to exploit complementarities is associated with a near doubling of taxable revenues for educational nonprofits and a one-third increase in taxable revenues for medical nonprofits. I do not find that charitable nonprofits have a similar ability to exploit production complementarities. On average, educational and medical nonprofits and older nonprofits are more able to exploit production complementarities. This suggests that useful measures of production complementarities include an indicator variable equal to one if the nonprofit is an educational or medical organization, and zero otherwise and a continuous measure of the nonprofit's age.
APPENDIX A
Yetman (2001) derives estimates of nonprofits' tax-motivated expense allocations from tax-exempt to taxable activities using a two-step procedure. In the first step, a first-difference regression of total expenses on taxable revenues, tax-exempt revenues, and investment revenues is used to partition variable expenses:
The product of the coefficient estimate and the organization-specific amount of taxable revenues is the estimate of variable expenses incurred to generate one dollar of taxable revenues. The same procedure is used to arrive at estimated variable expenses for tax-exempt and investing activities.
In the second step of the modeling process, the difference between total expenses and the sum of the variable expense components (i.e., organization-specific estimates of variable expenses for taxable, tax-exempt, and investing activities) is an estimate of fixed costs. Fixed costs are partitioned between taxable and tax-exempt activities using average revenues. The model does not allocate any fixed expenses to investing activities. The sum of allocated taxable variable expenses from the first step, plus the allocated taxable fixed expenses from the second step, is the estimate of total taxable expenses. The difference between this estimate of total taxable expenses and those reported by the nonprofits on their respective IRS form 990-Ts are the estimated joint cost allocations.
This procedure assumes that: (1) expenses are proportional to revenues, (2) the relationship between revenues and expenses is constant within nonprofit types (i.e., medical, educational, and charitable), and (3) variable expenses are incurred on a marginal basis and fixed expenses are incurred on an average revenue basis. The modeling procedure ignores (i.e., holds constant) the possibility that nonprofits can shift revenues across tax-exempt and taxable activities. Notes: Tax_Rev is taxable revenues from the form 990-T, in $thousands. Complement is 1 if the taxable and tax exempt activities are closely related in terms of production inputs, 0 otherwise. Joint_Costs is the difference between reported tax expenses and expected tax expenses in $thousands where expected tax expenses are from Yetman (2001) and reported tax expenses are from the form 990-T. Assets is the total ending assets of the nonprofit in units of $10 million. Age is the age of the nonprofit in years. Corptax is an indicator variable equal to one if nonprofit is located in a state with an income tax rate higher than 10 percent, zero otherwise. Grants is the ratio of government grants to total donations. Corrected tstatistics are in parentheses. (bottom) . Tax_Rev is taxable revenues from the form 990-T. Complement is 1 if the taxable and tax exempt activities are closely related in terms of production inputs, 0 otherwise. Joint_Costs is the difference between reported tax expenses and expected tax expenses where expected tax expenses are from Yetman (2001) and reported tax expenses are from the form 990-T. Assets is the total ending assets of the nonprofit. Age is the age of the nonprofit. Correlations in bold are significant at the 5% level. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Tax_Rev is taxable revenues from the form 990-T. Complement is 1 if the taxable and tax exempt activities are closely related in terms of production inputs, 0 otherwise. Joint_Costs is the difference between reported tax expenses and expected tax expenses where expected tax expenses are from Yetman (2001) and reported tax expenses are from the form 990-T. Assets and Assets 2 enter the model in units of $10 million. Corptax is an indicator variable equal to one if nonprofit is located in a state with an income tax rate higher than 10 percent, zero otherwise. Grants is the ratio of government grants to total donations. Corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.
